Explicit conceptual models are supposed to capture knowledge of lasting value in a reusable form. Reuse of explicit conceptual models is hampered by arbitrary and application-specific constraints; any constraints that conflict with a new application must be altered or removed before the models can be reused. This paper explores seven facets of relativity in explicit conceptual models using Formal Concept Analysis, demonstrating first that the capture of application-specific constraints is inextricable from the modelling process, and second that the semantic differences between models built for different applications can themselves be modelled formally in most cases. By analyzing those differences, one can determine whether the applications themselves are sufficiently compatible at the conceptual level to enable integration.
models built for different applications can themselves be modelled formally in most cases. By analyzing those differences, one can determine whether the applications themselves are sufficiently compatible at the conceptual level to enable integration.
The facets of conceptual relativity to be discussed are shown in Figure 1 . The term intent is already well-established in the knowledge modelling domain. The terms essence, identity, and unity were previously introduced to the knowledge modelling community by Nicola Guarino and Christopher Welty [1, 2] . The remaining terms have been introduced in parallel fashion to complete the framework needed to discuss conceptual relativity. The author regrets that philosophical terms may be objectionable to some readers; however, the dilemmas confounding knowledge modellers today were first identified and explored by philosophers, and the related work has no functional equivalent in computer science literature.
Universality
As the diagram suggests, the facets are not independent; neither do they fall neatly into categories. However, generally speaking, essence, identity, and unity have to do with individuality-the factoring of the domain of discourse into separate things. Possibility, tense, and realism have to do with modality-the factoring of the domain of discourse into different ways of existing. Essence, realism, and intent have to do with universality-the determination of what is held constant. Essence is an individual perspective on universality (what universality means for individuals); realism is a modal perspective on universality (what universality means for existence).
After notation and terminology are introduced, following sections examine the seven facets of conceptual relativity. These are followed by a discussion of compatibility for integration and the conclusion.
objects and the elements of M are called the attributes of the context. In order to express that an object g is in a relation I with an attribute m, we write gIm or (g, m) ∈ I and read it as "the object g has the attribute m".
For illustrative purposes a formal context is usually represented as a cross table (see Table 1 ).
m
. . .
g · · · · · · × Table 1 : Illustration for Definition 1, from [3] Definition 2 (was 19). For a set A ⊆ G of objects we define A := {m ∈ M | gIm for all g ∈ A} (the set of attributes common to the objects in A). Correspondingly, for a set B of attributes we define B := {g ∈ G | gIm for all m ∈ B} (the set of objects which have all attributes in B).
Definition 3 (was 20)
. A formal concept of the context (G, M, I) is a pair (A, B) with A ⊆ G, B ⊆ M , A = B and B = A. We call A the extent and B the intent of the concept (A, B). Table 2 illustrates the relationship between the extent (A) and the intent (B) of a concept. Definition 4 (was 21). If (A 1 , B 1 ) and (A 2 , B 2 ) are concepts of a context, (A 1 , B 1 ) is called a subconcept of (A 2 , B 2 ) provided that A 1 ⊆ A 2 (which is equivalent to B 2 ⊆ B 1 ). In this case, (A 2 , B 2 ) is a superconcept of (A 1 , B 1 ), and we write (A 1 , B 1 ) ≤ (A 2 , B 2 ). The relation ≤ is called the hierarchical order (or simply order) of the concepts. The set of all concepts of (G, M, I) ordered in this way. . . is called the concept lattice of the context (G, M, I).
For illustrative purposes a concept lattice is usually drawn as exemplified by Figures 2 et seq. Each concept is represented by a circle. The intent of the concept includes all attributes named along upward leading paths from the circle, while the extent of the concept includes all objects named along downward leading paths from the circle.
In most formal contexts, exemplary objects are given the same names as concepts that they exemplify to facilitate intuitive reading of the concept lattice. However, it is formally incorrect to equate any object with a concept that it exemplifies. This issue is discussed in detail in Section 9 (Realism).
Conceptual scaling [3, Section 1.3] [4] provides the formal basis for transforming many-valued attributes into one-valued attributes and for reasoning with different granularities (e.g., of space and time).
Definition 5 (was 27). A many-valued context (G, M, W, I) consists of sets G, M and W and a ternary relation I between G, M and W (i.e., I ⊆ G×M ×W ) for which it holds that (g, m, w) ∈ I and (g, m, v) ∈ I always imply w = v.
The elements of G are called objects, those of M (many-valued) attributes and those of W attribute values. Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the standard scales used in this paper. These are only examples; the techniques demonstrated here using the numbers 1 through 4 are applicable to all many-valued attributes. Definition 7. Let G be an arbitrary set (of time objects) and T := ((G, M, W, I T ), (S m | m ∈ M )) and C := ((G, E, V, I), (S e | e ∈ E)) scaled many-valued contexts (on the same object set G). Then the pair (T, C) is called a conceptual time system on G. T is called the time part and C the event part of (T, C). The scales S m and S e of the time and event part describe the chosen granularity structure for the values in these many-valued contexts.
Definition 8. Let P be a set (of 'persons', or 'objects', or 'particles') and G a set (of 'points of time') and Π ⊆ P × G a set (of 'actual objects'). Let (T, C) be a conceptual time system on Π and R ⊆ Π×Π. Then the tuple (P, G, Π, T, C, R) is called a conceptual time system (on Π ⊆ P × G) with actual objects and a time relation R, shortly a CTSOT.
For each object p ∈ P the set p Π := {g ∈ G | (p, g) ∈ Π} is called the (eigen)time of p in Π (which is the intent of p in the formal context (P, G, Π)).
Definition 9. Let (P, G, Π, T, C, R) be a CTSOT, and p ∈ P . Then for any mapping f : {p} × p Π → X (into some set X) the set f = {((p, g), f (p, g)) | g ∈ p Π } is called the f-life track (or f-trajectory or f-life line) of p.
For illustrative purposes a life track is usually drawn as an arrow in a concept lattice as exemplified by Figure 7 .
Modelling terminology
For the purposes of this paper, the Formal Concept Analysis notions on the right of Table 5 are used to model the corresponding generic modelling notions on the left. As a result, the terminologies shown in Table 5 are effectively interchangeable. The semantic differences among modelling environments that are glossed over by this substitution are clarified below. Process and event related notions are used only indirectly in this paper, so they are not enumerated here. Different views of time, which are central to process models, are discussed in Section 8 (Tense).
Generic modelling terminology
Groups / composite objects pose a dilemma for the formal context representation because sometimes they are viewed as whole objects and other times as collections of their parts. When this duality becomes important in Section 6 (Unity), the groups are rendered first as concepts, then as objects using the duality principle for concept lattices. *
The concept lattice in Figure 4 clarifies the semantic differences among terms from Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) [3] , Conceptual Graphs (CG) [9] , Unified Modeling Language (UML) version 1.5 [10] , the Resource Description Framework Schema (RDFS) [11, 12, 13] , Web Ontology Language (OWL) [14, 15, 16] , the Entity-Relationship Model (E-R) [17] , Object Role Modeling [18, 19] Table 6 . Technical notes supporting the characterizations in Figure 4 can be found in the Appendix. Figure 4 can be used as described in Section 11 (Compatibility for integration) to distinguish the cases in which the substitution of terminology is generally valid with respect to the five modelled attributes from the cases in which additional assumptions are required. For example, an RDFS class can be generalized to an FCA concept, but substituting an FCA concept for a Cyc mathematical set requires the synthesis of an intent (i.e., one must create a new attribute that represents membership in the set).
While the attributes selected for this analysis are sufficient to show coarse similarities and differences, they are not comprehensive. The existence of a subconcept relationship in this formal context does not imply subsumption in the full context of the implicated modelling environment.
A Aggregate (has extent, instances, elements, or members). C Composite (has parts). I Has explicit or implicit intent. Generically speaking, an intent is a definition in terms of necessary and sufficient properties from which the extent (instances, elements, or members) can be determined. P Has attributes / properties. P indicates specifically that the construct has attributes / properties at the model level, not at the meta level. The syntactic attachment of attributes to a class as a way of indicating that every instance of that class has those attributes, as in UML, should not be confused with the notion that the class itself has attributes. H Has haecceity [26] . A haecceity is a transcendental, non-qualitative property that establishes the identity of a thing. If a thing has haecceity, it is always distinct from other things, regardless of how similar they are. Things without haecceity (e.g., mathematical sets) are considered identical if all modelled attributes are the same (e.g., if two sets have the same members). 
Essence
A property of an entity is essential to that entity if it must hold for it. This is a stronger notion than one of permanence, that is, a property of an entity is not essential if it just happens to be true of it, accidentally. [1] To refer to properties as being essential to individuals is confusing. As Section 10 (Intent) will emphasize, essence has less to do with the thing itself and more to do with its classification. The appropriateness of any given classification is relative to the application.
For example, consider the classification of atoms. A given atom may be classified as a specific isotope, as a specific element, or as just an atom. Having a specific number of neutrons is an essential property of an isotope, but not of an element. Having a specific number of protons is an essential property of an element, but not of an atom.
A concept lattice using helium as an example is shown in Figure 5 . Suppose that one had a 5 He atom that at some point decayed to 4 He, emitting a neutron in the process. The 5 He effectively ceased to exist, and 4 He was created. Yet, from a more general viewpoint, a helium atom existed continuously and merely underwent a non-essential change.
There is nothing special about the selection of properties to be designated essential except in how they relate to the classifications used in an application. Nor is there anything special about the association of terms with classifications. In the above example, it was necessary to use a consistent terminology to make the example understood, but in general, terminology is not used consistently. The term helium gas as used by the pilot of an airship would refer only to a naturally occurring mixture in which 4 He predominates, while the term helium gas as used by a chemist might refer to any [stable] mixture of helium isotopes, including pure 3 He. See Figure 6 .
Helium gas (aviation)
Helium gas (chemistry) Figure 6 : Concept lattice for helium gas Any non-vacuous term can be made more specific, more general, or just different by adjusting the selection of essential properties. There is little grounds for optimism that different modellers would settle on the same ones. The ramifications for conceptual integrity are explored in detail in [27] .
The conscious or unconscious act of selecting essential properties is a process of abstraction [28] .
Identity
In general, identity refers to the problem of being able to recognize individual entities in the world as being the same (or different). . . . Identity criteria are conditions used to determine equality (sufficient conditions) and that are entailed by equality (necessary conditions). [1] Strictly speaking, identity is related to the problem of distinguishing a specific instance of a certain class from other instances by means of a characteristic property, which is unique for it (that whole instance). [2] When some thing undergoes a change, whether or not it is considered the same thing afterwards depends on how that thing is identified. Table 7 shows a many-valued formal context for the decay of the 5 He atom discussed in the previous section. Using nominal scales to transform the many-valued attributes, the formal context shown in Table 8 results.
As yet, no commitment has been made regarding whether the 4 He is the same atom as the 5 He. This formal context merely models observations of phenomena (1 and 2), which correspond to actual objects in Temporal Concept Analysis (see Definition 8). The decision to identify the two observations with the same atom is modelled with a CTSOT whose formal context is shown in Table 9 and whose time relation is (He,1) → (He,2). The life track of He is reflected by the arrow in the corresponding concept lattice shown in Figure 7 . If instead one chooses to view the 4 He as a different atom, one simply renames the actual objects (see Table 10 ). In this case the life tracks of the atoms disappear since there is only one applicable actual object for each of them. However, the formal context is structurally identical.
This example demonstrates that the decision to identify the two observations with the same atom or with different atoms is somewhat arbitrary. It is a subjective interpretation of objective phenomena. In contrast, some modelling environments treat identity as a haecceity [26] and cannot accurately represent the relationships among alternate identities.
As with essential properties, the conscious or unconscious act of selecting identity criteria is a process of abstraction.
That the appropriateness of any given selection of identity criteria is relative to the application is easily shown using a classic example.
The ship on which Theseus sailed with the youths and returned in safety, the thirty-oared galley, was preserved by the Athenians down to the time of t 1 t 2 2 protons 2 neutrons 3 neutrons Demetrius Phalereus. They took away the old timbers from time to time, and put new and sound ones in their places, so that the vessel became a standing illustration for the philosophers in the mooted question of growth, some declaring that it remained the same, others that it was not the same vessel. [29] If the application of the ship that existed in the time of Demetrius Phalereus were a historical exhibit by which to remember the life of Theseus, then identity criteria loose enough to admit a patched and restored version of the ship that Theseus took to sea would suffice.
To say "This is not the ship of Theseus" because some rotten wood was replaced would be misleading. But if the application were an investigation of the safety and seaworthiness of the vessel to determine whether Theseus was guilty of an act of negligence, then every board of the ship would need to be as it was when Theseus took it to sea. To say "This is the ship of Theseus" after work affecting its seaworthiness had been completed would be misleading.
Unity
Unity refers to the problem of describing the way the parts of an object are bound together, such that we know in general what is part of the object, what is not, and under what conditions the object is a whole. [1] Unity. . . is related to the problem of distinguishing the parts of an instance from the rest of the world by means of a unifying relation that binds them together (not involving anything else). [2] As noted by Melissus, unity relates to the more general notion of boundaries.
If it were not one, it would form a boundary in relation to something else. [30] One can define a thing by selecting spatial and temporal boundaries, deciding what is part of it and what is not. As with essential properties and identity criteria, the conscious or unconscious act of selecting boundaries is a process of abstraction. When formalized, the process is analogous to the examples in the previous section, where one subjectively picks objects out of a soup of observations.
It is often if not always the case that the spatial and/or temporal boundaries of a thing as people conceive of it are vague [31, 32] . Any precise model of such boundaries, including one using Formal Concept Analysis, necessarily adds arbitrary and application-specific constraints. However, one can use conceptual scaling to minimize the impact.
For example, once again considering the decay of 5 He, it is unlikely that the precise instant at which the atom decayed (or the instants at which the process of decay began and ended) would be known. However, it would be known with some certainty that it had not yet decayed at time t 1 , and that it had already decayed at time t 2 . With appropriate scaling, one need only consider those time granules for which precise knowledge is available.
Atomic decay makes an especially interesting example to illustrate the concept of unity because the parts of the whole do not, in fact, have identity. It is meaningless to ask which neutron was the escapee, or even whether the neutrons in the 4 He are the same ones as were in the 5 He. Any neutron is as good as any other. Nevertheless, the helium atom retains its identity. The actual object (n3,2), representing the observation of a third neutron at time t 2 , is within the temporal extents of He and 4 He but outside of their spatial extents.
The naming of the actual objects in this example is consistent with a notional identification of two protons and three neutrons having distinguishable life tracks. However, as stated above, this identification is meaningless. Fortunately, it is also superfluous in the formal context. One can rename the actual objects so that no connection between the particles observed at time t 1 and those observed at time t 2 is suggested, and the resulting context is structurally identical.
Using duality, one can reify the atoms as shown in Table 12 . 5 He decay with notional subatomic particles (p1,1) (p2,1) (n1,1) (n2,1) (n3,1) (p1,2) (p2,2) (n1,2) (n2,2) (n3,2) He 
Possibility
Possible things is a way of saying "things that might actually exist, but that we do not know exist;" alternately, "things that could potentially exist someday, but that do not exist now." Any hypothesized class that does not intend a logical contradiction could possibly have instances. For example, the class of 11 He atoms.
Let s be the statement "an 11 He atom actually exists." s is either true or false. Letting the truth attribute be represented by p, the falsehood attribute by ∼p, the concept lattice for Boolean logic is shown in Figure 9 . Table 13 . The corresponding lattice is shown in Figure 10 .
The uncertainty about possible things is not logical, but epistemic in nature. One accepts that s∨∼s is a tautology even if one does not know whether s or ∼s are individually true. Nevertheless, one can model the intent by interpreting the attributes epistemically and naming the unnamed concepts. Figure 11 shows the concept lattice for an epistemic modal logic. The names of the attributes have been prefixed by "know," reflecting the shift from properties to known properties (a Figure 10 : Concept lattice for modal logic statement can be true without one knowing that it is true, but not vice-versa). The naming of concepts is admittedly arbitrary, but it is significant that there can be as many as ten distinct, meaningful modalities of knowledge. If the logical modalities are discarded, it reduces to epistemic Boolean logic, shown in Figure 12 .
For one who is modelling with a context less rich than epistemic modal logic, the concept unknown is a valid generalization of possibility or negative possibility. However, neither truth nor falsehood would be a valid substitution for either one. Similarly, it would be an error to substitute tautology for either truth or fact, or to substitute contradiction for either falsehood or counterfactual. If, for example, the counterfactual "an 11 He atom actually exists" were made a contradiction (e.g., by declaring the class of 11 He atoms and the class actual thing to be disjoint), the model would be invalid if there were any time and place at which somebody managed to manufacture an 11 He atom. (One could argue that it is invalid a priori according to the formal semantics of necessity, but the debate is academic unless and until the counterexample appears.)
It is the tendency to make these invalid substitutions that creates the possible things reuse problem. A context that does not support unknown clearly leaves the modeller with little choice other than to make invalid substitutions. But too many unknowns results in a vacuous model-all things are possible; nothing can ever be ruled out. The treatment of possible things thus becomes a compromise between the desire for a generally valid model and the desire for a model that is constrained enough to enable the application for which it was built.
Subjectively, one might be less likely to declare the unreality of 11 He than of a more fanciful hypothetical, e.g., unicorns. Objectively, however, one can never disprove the existence of any hypothesized entity. One can argue relative likelihoods based on observations, but the step from unlikely to impossible requires a leap of faith (or rather the opposite-a leap of 
Tense
Since it is the goal of modellers to capture knowledge of lasting value, the question of how to model the past and future as distinct from the present is often ignored. The resulting model is timeless in the sense of having no concept of time whatsoever. Things simply are as they are, unchanging; or, if things do change, the result is a different model. There is no formal connection between the old and the new.
Timeless models (e.g., OWL ontologies) essentially exist in the "long now" contemplated by Augustine.
If there are times past and future, I desire to know where they are. [33] Those modellers who do model time choose to structure it in different ways. Tense logic structures time in terms of past, present, and future (a.k.a. the A-series or the tenser approach) [34] . UML sequence diagrams structure time in terms of earlier and later (a.k.a. the B-series or the detenser approach). Process Specification Language (PSL) [35] structures time in terms of reified time points (a.k.a. the four-dimensional approach).
These different structures of time can be reconciled using conceptual scaling as exemplified in Figure 13 . M1 is a tenser model whose present is between 08:00 and 10:00; M2 is a tenser model whose present is between 09:00 and 12:00. t 1 is an event occurring earlier than t 2 in a detenser model; one need not know exactly when they occurred, but the example reflects an assumption that they both occurred some time between 10:00 and 11:00. The timeless models M3 and M4 are assigned time granules corresponding to the times at which they are valid (from 09:00 to 11:00 for M3, always for M4). Any time scales can be integrated in this fashion provided that all of the temporal relations can be discovered. Of course, it is optimistic to assume that one would always be able to discern the intended time scales of different models with sufficient precision to get all of the temporal relations, let alone map them onto clock time as shown in Figure 13 . Fewer temporal relations results in coarser time granules. One knows that a granule is too coarse if it appears that any object should have two different situations within that granule (a violation of the unique-state theorem [8, Section 3.3]).
The "long now" of a static model (one granule for all time, as with M4) would be sufficient if, in the application of interest, no contradictions would result from instantiating all things past, present, and future as if they were contemporaries. However, it would not be sufficient for any application that needed to deal with change, since any kind of change would mean that some object had two different situations within the granule.
Realism
Absolute equality, absolute beauty, any absolute existence, true being-do they ever admit of any change whatsoever? . . . It must necessarily remain the same. . . . But how about the many things, for example, men, or horses, or cloaks, or any other such things, which bear the same names as the absolute essences and are called beautiful or equal or the like? . . . You can see these and touch them and perceive them by the other senses, whereas the things which are always the same can be grasped only by the reason, and are invisible and not to be seen. [36] As was mentioned in Section 4, classifying things is a process of abstraction. But some reject the claim that classes are abstractions of a higher level than the things classified.
Some modelling architectures segregate levels of abstraction (fixed architecture); others do not (flat architecture). The desirability of strict separation is a topic of debate. There are intuitively attractive notions that cannot be rendered faithfully using a fixed architecture. For example, consider the class that is called class. Intuitively, class is an instance of itself. But proponents of fixed architecture argue that it is confused thinking to identify any instance of a class with the class itself, and that doing so produces a model that has no sensible interpretation by man or machine [28, 37] , or at best an unconventional interpretation that does not integrate readily with conventional logic [38] . In any event, it certainly invalidates the set-theoretic interpretation of classification.
Ultimately, architectural support for separating levels of abstraction is only a convenience. It cannot enforce a way of thinking. A realist can always sabotage a fixed architecture by creating individuals that are interpreted as classes and relationships that are interpreted as instantiation. But in doing so, he or she abandons the formal semantics of that architecture and becomes dependent on a nonstandard, revisionist interpretation. In a similar way, one can interpret levels of abstraction onto a flat architecture if one is willing to replace that architecture's classification and inference rules with more restricted ones. Table 14 highlights the concept called possibility (medium font, outlined) and the exemplary object with the same name (bold font, double outlined) from Figure 11 . Clearly, they are not identical. The extent of the formal concept ({Counterfactual, Uncertainty, Possibility, Truth, Fact, Tautology}, {Know 3p}) includes all objects having the necessary attribute, but the exemplary object (Possibility) has no inherent relationship to those other objects (Counterfactual, etc.). The revisionist interpretation recognizes a special relationship between the exemplary object and the others that is unsupported by the formal semantics of the model. The concept whose intent consists of all attributes of an object g and whose extent consists of all objects having those attributes is called the object concept of the object g and is denoted by γg [3, Definition 22]. Formally, g and γg are not even comparable; one is an object, the other is a concept.
Know Know Know
In some applications, equivocation between g and γg might be safe if g were the only object in the contingent (the set of all objects belonging to the extent of the concept but not to the extent of any subconcept [39] ) of γg. In other applications, it might be safe only if g were the only object in the extent of γg. But this equivocation is always formally incorrect and inherently risky. There will be many applications in which it is completely unsafe.
The decision to use a fixed architecture or not is a technical one, influenced by the relative expedience of expressing the concepts needed to serve particular applications. However, as the example shows, the impedance mismatch between fixed and flat architectures is significant.
Intent
Mathematicians, generally, have an inclination toward extension, 'philosophers' toward intension. Now, it is interesting to note that mathematicians have a record of continuous constructive progress, and at each epoch have produced the highest kind of language known. . . . The 'philosophers', in the main, have a record of failure. [28, p. 176] Debate over the relative value of intent and extent continues with considerable energy. Some who favor a flat modelling architecture argue that it is more amenable to intensional definition of classes (which, presumably, is a good thing). The following definitions and discussion, while intended to address logics in particular, nonetheless illustrate the dilemma faced by modellers.
Extensional (adj., of a logic) A set-based theory or logic of classes, in which classes are considered to be sets, properties considered to be sets of <object, value> pairs, and so on. A theory which admits no distinction between entities with the same extension. See Intensional.
Intensional (adj., of a logic) Not extensional. A logic which allows distinct entities with the same extension.
(The merits and demerits of intensionality have been extensively debated in the philosophical logic literature. Extensional semantic theories are simpler, and conventional semantics for formal logics usually assume an extensional view, but conceptual analysis of ordinary language often suggests that intensional thinking is more natural. Examples often cited are that an extensional logic is obliged to treat all 'empty' extensions as identical, so must identify 'round square' with 'santa clause', and is unable to distinguish concepts that 'accidentally' have the same instances, such as human beings and bipedal hominids without body hair. The semantics described in this document is basically intensional.) [12, Glossary] Formal Concept Analysis reduces this dichotomy to a mathematical extreme, defining formal concepts in such a way that intensional definitions (in terms of necessary and sufficient attributes) and extensional definitions (in terms of objects) entail one other via a formal mapping. However, it is possible to combine intent and extent in other ways, sacrificing the ability to map between intent and extent in order to gain other useful abilities. For example, reference [27] uses a definition of class that incorporates the extensional characteristic of taking class membership as primitive and the intensional characteristic of defining necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for class membership. This compromise allows one to associate essential properties with classes without presuming that the set of properties is sufficient to define the class with respect to all possible and future things.
In a static universe, extensional definitions are sufficient. If two concepts have the same extent, then they are interchangeable within the scope of the static universe and there is no value in distinguishing them. The value of intent is in making statements regarding possible and future individuals. Unfortunately, these statements become problematic when some possible individual that breaks the assumptions of the modeller becomes actual or becomes known. Whether or not it is necessary to make statements about possible and future individuals or to distinguish concepts having the same extents is clearly applicationspecific, as is the selection of essential properties for intensional definitions (see Section 4).
To illustrate, Figure 14 shows a conceptual model used by a hypothetical knowledge engineer who is building a knowledge base. The engineer defines knowledge intensionally as a collection of true statements. Truth1 is a true statement, e.g., "All men are mortal." p is the truth attribute again as in Section 7. At this point it occurs to the knowledge engineer that the intensional definition of knowledge as a collection of true statements was not what he or she intended after all. While the statement "John Doe is a man" is true, it is only materially true, not necessarily true like the statement "All men are mortal." John Doe could be run over by a bus and cease being a man at any time. So the engineer's conceptualization evolves, now defining knowledge as a collection of necessarily true statements. Figure 16 shows an integration of the old and new conceptualizations. At time t 1 , the attributes 3∼p and 2p effectively do not exist, and Truth1 has only the attribute p. At time t 2 , the attributes 3∼p and 2p are created, making it possible to distinguish facts from tautologies. The new attribute 2p is ascribed to Truth1, effectively narrowing its classification.
Figure 16: Evolution of conceptualization
With a purely extensional approach, facts and tautologies collapse into the same concept at time t 1 , but are distinguishable at time t 2 , after the counterexample appears. The intent, as such, manifests indirectly in the engineer's decisions to place certain individuals in certain sets (the observable action resulting from an unobservable mental event) but is never explicitly stated. With a purely intensional approach, the intent is made explicit at time t 1 , but comes back to haunt at time t 2 , when the modeller is obliged either to classify something incorrectly or to make incompatible changes to the model. With the approach in [27] , an intent is made explicit at time t 1 , but the modeller is not obliged to classify something incorrectly or invalidate the model at time t 2 .
Compatibility for integration
When concepts from different applications are formalized and integrated into a single concept lattice, the ramifications of substituting a concept supported by one application for a concept supported by a different application, for a given set of objects, are immediately apparent. If the two concepts collapse into one in the concept lattice, then substitution is valid. Generalization-the substitution of a superconcept for one of its subconcepts-is also valid: if a given object has the attributes to be in the extent of the subconcept, then it necessarily has the subset of those attributes to be in the extent of the superconcept. All other substitutions are invalid.
In cases where it is believed that a generally invalid substitution would be valid under certain conditions, that validity can be proven or disproven by constructing a subcontext in which objects and/or attributes that violate those conditions are omitted. For example, returning to Figure 11 , it is invalid to substitute fact for truth or counterfactual for falsehood. However, if one assumes that it will never happen that one knows 3p or 3∼p without first knowing p or ∼p, respectively, then the attributes corresponding to knowledge of 3p and 3∼p are redundant and can be deleted. By deleting them, one creates the concept lattice shown in Figure 17 . The distinctions between fact and truth and between counterfactual and falsehood have disappeared, so the previously invalid substitutions are valid in the restricted subcontext. Unfortunately, some models constructed under flat architectures cannot be faithfully reproduced using Formal Concept Analysis, which exhibits a fixed architecture, so a conclusive analysis is not possible in every case.
A more thorough discussion of applying Formal Concept Analysis to integration problems can be found in [40] .
Conclusion
This paper explored seven facets of relativity in explicit conceptual models using Formal Concept Analysis, demonstrating first that the capture of application-specific constraints is inextricable from the modelling process, and second that the semantic differences between models built for different applications can themselves be modelled formally in most cases. By analyzing those differences, one can determine whether the applications themselves are sufficiently compatible at the conceptual level to enable integration.
It should be noted that all formal models require validation to convince the principals that they accurately reflect reality. An analysis of an invalid model may be conclusive, but the conclusions are still invalid. This observation applies to all models that aspire to be more than detached mathematical constructs having nothing to do with anything. As such, a detailed exploration of validation concerns is beyond the scope of this paper.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks all those whose reviews and suggestions have improved this paper, including Edward Barkmeyer, Peter Becker, Joachim Hereth Correia, Steven Fenves, and Michael Grüninger.
The concept lattices were produced using ToscanaJ version 1.5 [41, 42, 43] .
[20] EXPRESS language reference manual. ISO document 10303-11:1994, ISO, 1994.
[ 
Conceptual Graphs
Individuals have haecceity.
There is a set I = {#1, #2, #3, . Types have extent and intent. Two types can be the same, so they do not have haecceity.
Whether two concept types are the same depends on their links to the semantic network rather than their external instances. [9, Section 3.
2.1]
Attributes are represented using relations. Concepts appearing in a CG cannot represent types directly. The relations that types have to one another are at the meta level.
The type hierarchy is a higher-order relation [9, Section 3.2.1]
UML
The characterization is of UML version 1.5 [10] . As of 2004-07-23, UML version 1.5 remains current, though UML 2.0 is nearing completion. The Ontology Definition Metamodel [44] is still in early stages with four initial submissions.
UML objects have inherent identity, hence haecceity.
An object represents a particular instance of a class. It has identity and attribute values. [10, Section 3.39.1] Composite objects are objects with parts.
A composite object represents a high-level object made of tightly-bound parts. This is an instance of a composite class, which implies the composition aggregation between the class and its parts. [10, Section 3.40.1] Classes have intent and extent.
A class is the descriptor for a set of objects with similar structure, behavior, and relationships. The model is concerned with describing the intension of the class, that is, the rules that define it. The run-time execution provides its extension, that is, its instances. [10, Section 3.22]
Classes do not have attributes except at the meta level. In UML terminology, attribute refers to the "slot" attached to a class to indicate that every instance of that class-not the class itself-has a corresponding attribute value.
An attribute is semantically equivalent to a composition association [10, Section 3.25.1]
An association declares a connection (link) between instances of the associated classifiers (e.g., classes). [10, Section 2.5.
4.1]
It is not possible in UML for two classes to be the same (if it were, they would not have a mapping into programming languages like C++), so UML classes have haecceity.
RDFS
Everything is a resource.
All things described by RDF are called resources, and are instances of the class rdfs:Resource. [13, Section 2.1]
Resources have properties.
The RDF Concepts and Abstract Syntax specification [11] describes the concept of an RDF property as a relation between subject resources and object resources. Classes (as well as containers) are resources, so they also have properties.
By analogy with logical predicates, classes have intent but not haecceity.
Class (n.) A general concept, category, or classification. Something used primarily to classify or categorize other things. Formally, in RDF, a resource of type rdfs:Class with an associated set of resources all of which have the class as a value of the rdf:type property. Classes are often called 'predicates' in the formal logical literature. [12, Glossary] In general, there is nothing to prevent two resources from being the same and no assumption that they are distinct, so containers do not have haecceity either. 
E-R
Entities have haecceity.
An entity is a "thing" which can be distinctly identified. [17, Section 2.2]
Entities have attributes and relationships to other entities, both of which suffice as "attributes / properties" for the purpose of Figure 4 .
A relationship is an association among entities.
An attribute can be formally defined as a function which maps from an entity set or a relationship set into a value set or a There is no provision for the possibility that two entities would be the same, so entities have haecceity.
Cyc
Mathematical sets and collections do not have attributes (in the sense "spatial and temporal properties"). Cyc collections are natural kinds or classes, as opposed to mathematical sets; their instances have some common attribute(s). Each Cyc collection is like a set in so far as it may have elements, subsets, and supersets, and may not have parts or spatial or temporal properties. Sets, however, differ from collections in that a mathematical set may be an arbitrary set of things which have nothing in common (see #$Set-Mathematical). In contrast, the instances of a collection will all have in common some feature(s), some 'intensional' qualities. In addition, two instances of #$Collection can be co-extensional (i.e., have all the same instances) without being identical, whereas if two arbitrary sets had the same elements, they would be considered equal. [22, Fundamental, #$Collection]
Collections are individuated by their intensional criteria for membership [22, Mathematics, #$SetOrCollection]. It follows that if the membership criteria of two collections are equivalent, they are indistinguishable; hence they do not have haecceity.
The ability to have spatial and temporal properties is divided in fine gradations among many subclasses of #$Individual. For brevity, attributes are simply ascribed to Cyc individuals in Figure 4 .
It is possible to assert that two individuals are the same; therefore, individuals do not have haecceity.
(#$equals THING1 THING2) means that THING1 and THING2 are numerically (as opposed to qualitatively) identical, i.e. they are one and the same thing. A sentence of the above form is true if and only if the terms occupying the two argument-places of '#$equals' denote the same thing. [22, Fundamentals, #$equals]
Groups are composite objects with spatial and temporal properties. Like other individuals, they lack haecceity.
Each instance of #$Group is a composite object made up of one or more individual objects or events. A group is related to each of its members by the predicate #$groupMembers (q.v. 
F-logic
Frame Logic makes no formal distinction between classes and individual objects. Any Flogic object can play the role of a class in subclassing and membership relationships. The word "class" is used informally to describe objects that so participate. Any object can have properties.
Objects (including classes) do not have haecceity. It is possible for two objects to be the same.
Equality may be derivable even if it is not mentioned explicitly. 
